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Can political reservations affect political equilibria in the long-term?  
Evidence from local elections in rural India 
 
Abstract: While many studies explored impacts of political quotas for females, often with ambiguous results, 
underlying mechanisms and long-term effects have received relatively little attention. Nation-wide data from 
India spanning a 15-year period allow us to explore how reservations affect leader qualifications, service 
delivery,  political  participation,  local  accountability,  and  individuals‟  willingness  to  contribute  to  public 
goods. Although leader quality declines and impacts on service quality are ambiguous, gender quotas are 
shown to increase political processes and participation, the willingness to contribute to public goods, and 
perceived ability to hold leaders to account. Key effects persist beyond the reserved period and impacts on 
females often materialize only with a lag. 
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1. Introduction 
Many developing countries suffer from long-standing and quantitatively large bias against women in 
terms of asset ownership and access to public goods and services. Redressing such bias is important not 
only for ethical reasons but also because social exclusion can reduce overall welfare and threaten social 
stability. Lack of voice that prevents women from ensuring that their specific needs are taken into account 
in the sphere of public service delivery as well as policy design is generally believed to be an important 
factor reinforcing such bias. Quotas that aim to increase women‟s political power by reserving a share of 
the seats contested in any election for females have therefore attained great popularity. In fact some 100 
countries worldwide are reported to practice gender quotas in some form to overcome gender bias and 
long-standing inequalities.  
Despite their political attractiveness and widespread adoption, electoral quotas are not uncontroversial. 
Supporters argue that empowering members of groups who had historically been disadvantaged can result 
in more inclusive processes of policy-making drawing in those previously excluded. This can change the 
median voter‟s preferences and thus the outcomes from political decision-making. To the extent that it 
improves access to public goods (e.g. education or roads) by those who earlier excluded or marginalized, 
this can be Pareto optimal and ensure better development and use of a society‟s human potential. Critics 
note that such measures run a danger of bringing to office individuals who lack necessary qualifications 
and may then be easily manipulated by traditional elites. In addition to adverse effects when they are in 
force, reservations may also adversely affect behavior by competitively elected leaders who, because they 
are prevented from standing for re-election, will have their time horizon truncated and thus be tempted to 
adopt myopic patterns of behavior that are do not maximize long term social welfare.    2 
Which side of this debate is correct is an empirical question. However, while a large and increasing 
number of studies explore the topic, virtually all of them focus on contemporaneous effects during the 
immediate reservation period. For a variety of reasons, these may be very different from longer-term 
changes in behavior the change of which is the ultimate goal of reservations. For a assessment of the 
extent to which such policies achieve their objective, it will thus be important to complement them with 
evidence on the extent to which reservation-induced effects persist over time. Looking at longer-term 
effects could also provide insights regarding channels through which such effects materialize, an issue of 
great interest for policy.  
India is of particularly interest in this respect. To overcome long-standing discrimination by gender and 
caste, far-reaching decentralization of power in the early 1990s was combined with regulations mandating 
that a share of elected leadership positions be „reserved‟ for women and other disadvantaged groups. As 
villages subject to reservation are chosen randomly in any given period, differences between reserved and 
non-reserved locations can be interpreted in a causal sense. The fact that, at the point of our survey, the 
policy had been in effect for more than a decade also allows us to examine whether -and if yes how- 
reservations affected long-term outcomes. Beyond the broader interest in such results, recent debates in 
India about extending female reservations to the state and national levels imply that such evidence can 
also inform the country‟s ongoing policy debate.  
We draw on a large national sample to assess impacts of female reservations on the perceived quality with 
which public goods are delivered, individuals‟ level of political participation and willingness to make a 
matching contribution to provide local public goods, and their self-reported ability to hold leaders to 
account. Conceptually, three main aspects are relevant. Based on the literature, we expect two effects that 
may go in opposite directions. On the one hand, reserved (female) leaders‟ lower qualifications -together 
with limited short-term discretion over budgets- could lead to a leader quality effect that would reduce the 
quality of public service provision under reservation. On the other hand, by making political processes 
more inclusive and thereby increase voters‟ ability to voice concerns and hold leaders to account, it may 
lead to more effective political participation. Also, a number of reasons -including learning about political 
processes by previously excluded voters or reversal of policies after reservations expire- suggest that 
some impacts of reservation may materialize with a lag so that medium term effects may be very different 
from those observed in the short term. To account for this, we distinguish immediate effects from those 
that might accrue in the medium term.  
Three sets of results are relevant. First, we find weak or negligible effects of reservation on the perceived 
quality of public good provision in the period when they are in force. Reasons might be because either (i)   3 
the positive results reported in some of the literature are limited to some regions or states with specific 
characteristics; (ii) respondents‟ perceptions are biased either by prejudices or by lack of direct exposure 
which prevent them from accurately reporting or assessing outcomes for specific public goods; or (iii) 
leader quality and political participation effects alluded to above are of similar magnitude and thus cancel 
out. At the same time, we find that reservations increase the quality of political processes and the extent to 
which they conform to rules, the level of participation, and -possibly as a result- individuals‟ willingness 
to contribute to public goods. These effects persist over time and, for females, materialize with some lag 
that could point towards learning. Moreover, individuals report a significant increase in their perceived 
ability to hold local officials accountable for provision of public service and discharging of their duties. 
Even if it imposes cost in the short term, female reservation can yield positive social benefits overall and 
a key channel for it to have an effect is through greater and more effective political participation.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section two provides context by discussing the rationale for quotas by 
discussing in more detail the Indian context and the hypotheses guiding our investigation. Section three 
describes the data and compares key outcome variables -in terms of leader quality, total spending, change 
in perceived quality of public services, political participation, and willingness to contribute to public 
goods,  between  reserved  and  unreserved  panchayats.  Section  four  builds  on  this  by  econometrically 
exploring  persistence  and  potential  heterogeneity  of  reservations.  Section  five  concludes  with  policy 
implications and suggestions for future research.  
2. Gender quotas: Rationale, evidence, and approach  
Concern about a failure of pre-existing and often deep-rooted gender gaps to narrow over time led many 
countries to adopt policies that reserve a certain share of political positions for females. Evidence on the 
impact of such policies is mixed and rather inconclusive. In India, high levels of gender discrimination 
provided the justification for legislation that reserved, in any election after 1995, leadership for females in 
one third of villages, randomly selected. While some note that leaders coming to power in this way may 
be less qualified and more prone to being influenced by others than those elected on unreserved seats, 
others find that these policies had significant impact on quality of public goods. We describe channels for 
such impacts to materialize, draw out implications for longer-term effects beyond the immediate period 
during which reservations had been imposed, and describe how these can be tested with the data at hand.  
2.1 Female political participation in perspective 
Women‟s preferences have been shown to differ from those by males (Edlund and Pande 2002) with 
potentially  far-reaching  effects  on  intra-household  decision  making  and  democratic  voting  outcomes   4 
(Funk and Gathman 2008). Although standard political economy models with full pre-commitment imply 
that policy-makers‟ attributes -including their gender- will not mater for outcomes (Downs 1957), these 
have often been found to be inconsistent with empirical evidence. Citizen-voter models formalize the idea 
that legislators‟ identity can matter for outcomes (Besley and Coate 1997, Osborne and Slivinski 1996).  
Many  societies  are  characterized  by  under-representation  of  females  in  bodies  for  policy  making  at 
national or local level (Dahlerup 2006).
1 If such lack of representation is due to institutional barriers, 
cultural norms, or voter discrimination and if po licy-makers‟ attributes matter, actions to increase this 
share could affect the nature of political equilibria and, by implication, long-term outcomes. This has been 
the main justification for affirmative action, including quotas to reserve a share of political positions for 
females, to  bring  about  greater  equality  in  opportunities and  outcomes.  Gendered  quotas to  increase 
women‟s share of elected positions have become very popular and, in different forms, been introduced in 
more than 100 countries (Krook 2009). In some cases, such measures have led to perceptible shifts in the 
composition of legislatures as in the case of Rwanda where, after establishment of a gender quota (of 30%) 
in 2003, female parliamentarians now make up the majority of the legislative assembly (Powley 2007). 
Quotas have also been introduced in many European countries although in some cases their impact may 
be diminished by the fact that often they apply to candidates rather than seats.
2  
Across countries, studies suggest that female participation in legislative processes helped to overcome 
gender bias in access to specific services and that female legislators tended to allocate more funds to 
causes important to women  (Paxton and Hughes 2007, Reingold 1992, Saint -Germain 1989). Effective 
provision of greater volumes of public goods could then help previously disadvantaged groups to more 
quickly eliminate such biases while greater political participation increases the pool of talent which the 
system can draw upon or allow greater deliberation and innovati on to eliminate mistakes in the process 
(Page 2007). Studies suggest that higher levels of female representation in parliament are associated with 
lower levels of corruption  (Dollar et al. 2001) as well as more spending per student, higher shares of 
female teachers, and greater secondary enrollment by girls. Greater female representation is also found to 
improve women‟s access to health via higher public spending that in turn is noted to increase the number 
of doctors and women‟s ability to receive pre-natal care (Knack and Sanyal 2000).  
Studies exploiting differences in the timing of the introduction of female voting across US states suggest 
that expansion of the suffrage to women led to increased public spending and more liberal voting patterns, 
                                                 
1 Globally, less than 20% of members in national parliaments are female, although this varies from close to parity in Nordic and some African 
countries such as Rwanda to some 10 percent in Arab states (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 2008). 
2 For example in France, although 50% of candidates are required to be women, only 18% make it to the national assembly (Frechette et al. 2008).   5 
a phenomenon that persisted over time as females gradually took advantage of the franchise (Lott and 
Kenny 1999). Laws extending voting to females were followed by shifts in legislative behavior and large 
increases in local health spending (Miller 2008). At the same time, the impact of gender reservations is 
context  specific.  Evidence  of  higher  female  participation  increasing  health  spending  (Rehavi  2008) 
contrasts to findings from mayoral elections during the 2000s where policy-makers‟ gender did not appear 
to have any on effect on the size of government, the composition of municipal spending and employment, 
or actual outcomes such as crime rates (Ferreira and Gyourko 2010). One possible explanation is that city 
governments come closer to the Downsian model.
3 In Californian school boards where females already 
hold 45% of elected seats, an anti -incumbent bias was observed whereby adding an additional female 
(male) increased the likelihood of a male (female) winning the next election (Schwarz 2010).  
2.2 Gender reservations in the Indian context 
India is characterized by large gender gaps in key human development indicators such as child mortality 
and  malnutrition  as  well  as  levels  of  antenatal  coverage,  contraceptive  use,  adolescent  fertility,  and 
maternal mortality that are much worse than what is found in countries with similar or even lower levels 
of per capita income.
4 Discrimination against females originates in marriage practices and caste structures 
that show little sign of disappearing and may even be reinforced over time (Anderson 2003). Despite high 
overall growth since the mid-1990s, gender gaps widened in southern states that enjoyed higher levels of 
income growth and higher initial levels  of female empowerment (e.g. AP, KA, TN), suggesting that 
economic growth alone may not be sufficient to bring about gender equality. Persistently high levels of 
gender inequality are often believed to be reinforced by deficient provision of public goods, e.g. maternal 
health and peri-natal care for girl children (Bhalotra and Rawlings 2011). To the extent that they can bring 
about better and more equitable provision of such services, quotas to bring women into positions of power 
could help to address and eventually overcome such bias.  
In 1992, India‟s 73
rd Constitutional Amendment mandated far-reaching decentralization by establishing a 
three-tier system of district-, block- and village-level councils. The gram panchayat (GP) is the lowest 
tier of local government at village level. It comprises a president (pradhan or sarpanch) and council 
members who are elected from the panchayat‟s wards. Its responsibilities include (i) provision of major 
public services such as health, education, drinking water, and roads; (ii) setting rates and administering 
local taxes; (iii) administration, formulation and implementation of local development plans; and (iv) 
                                                 
3 Females are found to have higher levels of unobserved political skill, supporting the hypothesis that they may have had to overcome gender bias 
to be successful in politics. 
4 UNDP‟s gender inequality index, based on 2008 data, ranks India 122 out of 138 countries, below Rwanda (83), Lao PDR (88), Egypt (108), 
Moldova (38), and China (40).   6 
selection of beneficiaries and implementation of social and economic programs established and paid for 
by central government. Regular assemblies (gram sabhas) by all voters in the GP are meant to monitor 
performance and increase democratic accountability. To prevent decentralization from reinforcing rather 
than reducing the power wielded by traditional elites and to counter what was perceived as a legacy of 
disenfanchisement  and  under-representation  by  females  and  other  disadvantaged  groups,  this  was 
combined with reservation of a share of seats for women or scheduled castes and tribes.
5  
In fact, a number of studies find that efforts to increase female participation in political processes and 
decision-making had significant impacts. In West Bengal and Rajasthan, femal e policy makers provide 
more public goods more valued by female voters such as water and roads  (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2004). Mandated changes in female leadership prompted by quotas were found to increase the quality of 
political processes and prompt greater female participati on in  gram  sabha  meetings  in  South  India 
(Besley et al. 2005). Reservations were also found to be associated with higher levels of child survival, an 
effect that is attributed to improved access to (and use of) services such as antenatal care and public birth 
facilities in villages led by females (who are more attuned to the needs of child health) which translate 
into significantly higher levels of breastfeeding and immunization (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2010). 
The impacts of reservations can be felt in other spheres as well; phased introduction of reservations at 
state level is used to argue that female reservations gave women greater voice, resulting in increased 
reporting of crimes against women and greater resistance to violence (Iyer et al. 2010). Reserved seats 
occupied by low-caste or tribal (but not high-caste) females are also argued to have resulted in higher 
levels  of  investment  in  health  and  early  education  and  more  effort  to  implement  redistributive  land 
reforms and inheritance legislation favorable to women (Clots-Figueras 2009).  
However, these studies contrast with others that point towards more ambiguous or even negative effects 
of reservations. Three explanations for this are that other factors may be relevant, that female leaders‟ 
quality may be lower, or that effects may be only short term. A first set of explanations suggests that, 
once  other  factors  are  controlled  for,  or  for  some  types  of  outcomes,  female  pradhans‟  presumed 
advantages vanish or may even be below those of pradhans elected without restrictions (Ban and Rao 
2008, Besley et al. 2004, Rajaraman and Gupta 2008). In some cases, aggregation may also be an issue as 
no effects are found in the aggregate but  for some  sub-groups  (Dongre 2010). A study focusing on 
selection of beneficiaries from central government schemes suggests that, in this respect, reservation had 
                                                 
5 At village level, most states reserve one third of council members and pradhan positions for women. By comparison, the share of positions 
reserved to ST/SCs equals the population share of the ST/SC population (Bardhan et al. 2010). Although a large number of studies explored the 
impacts of caste reservations (Krishnan 2007, Pande 2003), our focus is on those for females. At district level, it appears that reservation of 
positions in the legislature for scheduled castes but not tribes improves access to education facilities, mainly primary schools, for relevant 
constituencies.   7 
few, if any, positive effects on women. It worsened within-village targeting of such transfers to lower 
caste  groups  and  failed  to  improve  other  targeting  dimensions.  This  implies  that,  for  disadvantaged 
women, the net effect of reservations was actually negative (Bardhan et al. 2010). While such an outcome 
can  be  explained  in  a  number  of  ways,
 6 it  suggests  that  greater  clarity  on  channels  through  which 
reservations may affect results and attention to potential negative effects will be required. Three factors, 
namely (i) leaders‟ qualifications; (ii) the nature of political decision-making; and (iii) persistence and 
potential long-term effects seem to be of particular relevance.  
Reservations -especially for caste- may undermine the ability of traditional social institutions to discipline 
leaders  in  situations  where  other  forms  of  political  organization  (e.g.  parties)  are  non-existent  or 
ineffective. This can, at least in principle, result in selection of leaders with inferior characteristics and, 
consequently, reduced levels or quality in provision of public goods (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2008). 
While such effects should be less pronounced for gender reservations, in Tamil Nadu women pradhans on 
reserved seats are reported to have fared very badly –in fact much worse than SCs and STs– in a test 
designed to measure their understanding of relevant gram panchayat procedures (Gajwani and Zhang 
2008). Attributing outcomes solely to the leader‟s gender is also equivalent to assuming full pradhan 
dominance  of  the  gram  panchayat.  This  may  be  at  variance  with  ground  realities  where  women 
occupying  reserved  seats  are  often  poorly  educated  and  may  be  guided  by  traditional  elites  (often 
husbands or family members) who may pull the strings from behind the scenes (Rajaraman and Gupta 
2008). There is indeed evidence suggesting that female leaders depend on access to social and political 
networks through traditional leaders and that this reduce their ability to control events.
 7  
Finally, as reservations will be in place for a limited time only, their impact can be appreciated only by 
looking beyond the immediate period when they are imposed. If they bestow power on representatives 
from disadvantaged groups who then will (for a limited time) direct public goods or programs towards 
their constituency, any effects observed during the reservation period may well be reversed -or possibly 
even  over-compensated-  once  reservations  have  expired.  This  hypothesis  receives  support  from  the 
ambiguous longer-term effects of reservations on access to and quality of public goods found in longer-
term studies that consider outcomes for more than just one period (Bardhan et al. 2010, Raabe et al. 2009). 
If, on the other hand, (female) reservation changes either the way in which public goods are provided or 
                                                 
6 The explanation favored by the study under concern is that female reservation is inconsistent with traditional models of electoral competition. It 
concludes that a more complex approach of capture-cum-clientelism os more appropriate but may itself be is susceptible to being weakened by 
election of inexperienced women to reserved positions (Bardhan et al. 2010). 
7 In the Tamil Nadu study quoted earlier, some 80% indicated that their official decisions were to be influenced by their husbands, potentially 
pointing towards limited autonomy in decision-making (Gajwani and Zhang 2008).   8 
the pattern of political participation and the associated political equilibrium, in particular the nature of the 
median voter, it can have long-term impacts.  
Three channels through which reservations could affect outcomes in the long term are of relevance. First, 
they might prompt those who previously had not participated in political process to permanently change 
their behavior. Some evidence for persistent effects via greater participation along these lines is available 
from rural West Bengal (Beaman et al. 2010) and South India (Besley et al. 2005) as well as urban 
Mumbai (Bhavnani 2009). Second, they may trigger a process of learning and revision of prejudices. For 
example, reservations are argued to have led to exposure and revision of stereotypes regarding females‟ 
leadership qualities in a number of settings (Beaman et al. 2009). In particular, voters who traditionally 
had been excluded from political processes may require time to learn about how to access information 
about leaders‟ performance and ways to use such information to induce more „appropriate‟ behavior by 
policy-makers. A third option less emphasized in the literature could be that, especially if they increase 
voice and political participation or shift the composition of public goods towards those more valued by 
certain  groups,  reservation  may  lead  voters  to  increase  their  contributions  to  public  goods.  Such 
contributions can be very relevant because, even if key infrastructure such as roads or schools has been 
established  (e.g.  through  central  funds),  the  lifespan  and  effectiveness  of  such  investment  will  be 
significantly affected by the amount of effort devoted to local maintenance or monitoring by beneficiaries 
to prevent service providers (e.g. school teachers) from shirking. While only a few studies explore the 
willingness  to  contribute  to  better  service  quality  in  India  (Chandrashekhar  2008),  the  underlying 
mechanisms  have  been  studied  in  a  number  of  contexts  (Bagnoli  and  Lipman  1989,  Messer  and 
Zarghamee 2007). Below, we will explicitly test for this possibility.  
2.3 Data and approach  
We use data from a nationally-representative panel survey of 233 villages in rural India conducted in 
2007 by the National Council of Applied Economics (NCAER) to explore these issues. In addition to its 
national coverage, this dataset, which is based on questionnaires at household and village levels, has three 
features of interest. First, it spans a 15 year-period that includes the current panchayat which, in most 
states, was elected in or after 2005, as well as the two previous ones for which elections were held around 
2000 and 1995. For all of these, information on whether a reservation was in place, the election process, 
key characteristics and perceived leadership qualities by the pradhan, and relative quality of public good 
provision in different categories was obtained via recall. Second, individual data on political participation 
as well as the type of such participation -e.g. whether an individual raised issues in gram sabha meetings- 
is  available  for  all  household  members  16  and  older  for  the  three  panchayat  periods.  This  is   9 
complemented by an assessment of the ease with which local office-holders can be held to account. Third, 
for the current period, individuals were asked whether they would be willing to contribute to different 
types of public goods if doing so would trigger a larger government contribution to explore whether 
having pradhan reserved for a female affects the willingness to contribute to public goods.
  
As reservations are assigned randomly, OLS regressions of outcome variables on a reservation dummy 
and controls will yield unbiased and consistent estimates of such policies‟ impact. This allows empirical 
testing of hypotheses regarding contemporaneous or lagged impacts of reservations on a set of outcome 
variables (superscripted by j) regarding effectiveness of public good provision, participation in political 
processes,  and  willingness  to  contribute  to  local  public  goods.  Letting  i,v,  and  t  denote  individuals, 
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where Y
j
ivt is the outcome variable of interest, βv is a village or state fixed effect,
8 Rvt and Rit-1is dummy for 
current or lagged reservation that equals one if the pradhan position in village v at t or t-1 was reserved for 
females and zero otherwise, Xivt is a vector of household and individual characteristics, Dt is a vector of 
time dummies, and β1, β2, β3 are parameters to be estimated. While β1 can be interpreted as the effect of a 
contemporaneous reservation on Y
j, we are able to explore heterogeneity of this effect by gender, caste, or 
landownership by introducing the relevant interaction with Rvt and, more importantly are able to test for 
persistence and dynamic effects by estimating β2, the impact of having had a reservation in the past on 
current outcomes. Below, we briefly summarize our hypotheses with respect to outcome variables in the 
area of public good provision, participation and accountability, and individuals‟ willingness to contribute.  
First, in line with the literature, we use (1) to test whether female reservations lead to a change in the mix 
or perceived quality of public goods provided by local government, overall or for different groups of 
individuals. To do so, we divide such goods into three broad categories, i.e. those relating to (i) social 
infrastructure  including  sanitation  and  sewage,  drinking  water,  education,  and  health;  (ii)  productive 
infrastructure such as roads, irrigation and electricity; and (iii) club goods such as credit, government 
schemes,  street  lights,  and  ceremonies,  the  benefits  from  which  are  at  least  partly  appropriable.  As 
discussed above, a number of reasons imply that we expect this impact to be ambiguous.  
A second set of questions addresses the extent to which reservations affect participation in and quality of 
local political processes (e.g. whether agendas for gram sabha meetings are available in advance, minutes 
                                                 
8 For the regressions where data from multiple Panchayat periods are available, we use village fixed effect.  In the case of villagers‟ willingness to 
contribute to improve local issues, we can only use the state dummies because the data are only available for the current Panchayat period.     10 
are kept, and issues are raised by certain groups) including respondents‟ assessment of the ease with 
which they are able to hold local officials to account. This is relevant if a main goal of reservations is to 
allow those who had traditionally been excluded or lacked voice to more effectively participate in politics. 
Participation  in  India‟s  village  elections  has  traditionally  been  high  and  convening  regular  village 
assemblies (gram sabhas) is mandatory. In practice, local capture often limits the number and deliberative 
character of such assemblies, making it difficult for disadvantaged groups to effectively voice concerns 
(Singh 2007). To the extent that it changes any of these variables, reservation could improve participation 
in and results from political processes. Data on meeting participation, outcomes, and perceived ability to 
hold office-holders to account in multiple periods allows us to test hypotheses regarding the nature and 
persistence of reservation-induced impacts on the nature of political processes.
 9  
A third aspect that can be addressed with our data relates to individuals‟ willingness to make public good 
contributions. To test whether, for example by increasing voice and effective participation, reservation of 
leadership positions for females might prompt individuals to contribute more towards public goods, we 
use individuals‟ stated willingness to contribute a modest amount (100 Rs.) to different categories of 
public goods if doing so would allow securing a matching government contribution of much larger size.
 10 
While this variable is available only for the current period, thus requiring a slight modification of (1), the 
fact that we have information on whether a particular village was reserved in the past still allows us to test 
for persistence of such effects.  
3. Descriptive evidence 
Descriptive data indeed suggest that „reserved‟ leaders have lower levels of observable qualifications and 
experience. Subjective assessments of perceived changes in quality of service delivery, however, fail to 
support the hypothesis that this reduces the quality of service delivery. Moreover, reservation seems to be 
associated with higher levels of political participation, greater willingness to contribute to public goods, 
and better perceived ability to hold leaders to account in a number of dimensions.  
3.1 Leader qualification and subjective quality of public good provision  
                                                 
9 The wording for the three questions on holding local leaders to account was as follows: „How easy is it for you to get problems associated with 
local service provision (such as repairing the road in front of your house, ensuring that the street lights function, etc.) fixed?‟, „How easy is it for 
you to hold local officials accountable for the functions they are supposed to be performing?‟ and „How transparent is the process of beneficiary 
selection regarding various government schemes in your village?‟ For the first two, possible answers were coded as 1 not a problem at all; 2 very 
easy; 3 relatively easy; 4 quite difficult and 5 impossible. For the third question, answers were coded as 1 completely transparent; 2 very 
transparent; 3 relatively transparent; 4 quite non-transparent; and 5 completely non-transparent.  
10 To obtain an indication of individuals‟ willingness to contribute at the margin (for the current panchayat period), the question was phrased as 
follows. “Imagine the Government decides to contribute an additional Rs. 1 lakh (100,000) to solve a local problem but only if the majority of 
village households contribute Rs. 100 each. Imagine that almost enough people are willing to contribute and your decision to contribute or not 
will decide the outcome. Would you be willing to contribute Rs. 100 if the issue was ….?”.    11 
A key precondition for OLS estimates to be interpreted as a causal estimate of the impacts of reservation 
is that allocation of reserved seats across villages is indeed random. The fact that the last round of the 
panel survey was conducted in 1999 allows us to test this for the 2000 election. Descriptive statistics for 
village and household characteristics in 1999 in panel 1 and 2 of table 1 reveals little if any bias in this 
regard. Some 30% (71 out of 233) of the sample villages were reserved in this period. Reserved and 
unreserved villages are similarly sized and have similar levels of access to infrastructure and public goods 
(drinking water, anganwadi, food for work programs, with a difference only in the number of health 
workers. Household characteristics such as education, age, assets, income, and its composition, are not 
significantly different between reserved and unreserved villages either.  
Comparison  of  pradhans  in  reserved  an  unreserved  panchayats  (table  2)  points  to  some  significant 
differences. The top panel 2 suggests that those on reserved seats have significantly lower educational 
qualifications; 25% as compared to less than 5% on unreserved seats are illiterate, and only 29% and 6% 
of them (vs. 70% and 27% respectively) completed at least secondary or high school. This also implies 
that very few „unreserved‟ pradhans had been involved in politics before; the share of Pradhans who held 
GP positions or ran for Pradhan or ward member before is significantly higher in unreserved compared to 
reserved  villages  (24%  versus  12%  and  22%  versus  7%  for  previous  positions  or  candidacies, 
respectively). Female reservation appears to not significantly affect the probability of other marginalized 
groups, in particular scheduled castes and tribes or religious minorities, to be elected, allaying fears about 
potential negative equity consequences of this policy. The fact that women make up only 7% of pradhans 
in unreserved villages suggests that, without quotas, female participation would have been much lower. 
Reservations bring in new officials; compared to a quarter who had held office before in unreserved 
panchayats,  only  some  12%  do  so  in  reserved  ones.  Also,  only  7%,  as  compared  to  some  21%  in 
unreserved seats had been running for office without being elected before. 
Table 2 panel 2 shows that reserved seats are no less competitive than unreserved ones. To the contrary, 
with 76% as compared to 72% for unreserved ones, elections for reserved seats  in states where the 
pradhan is directly elected attract slightly higher voter turnout.
11 The bottom panel highlights that there is 
no significant difference in size and structure of budgets between reserved and unreserved panchayats. As, 
with some 90% of local budgets from central transfers, own revenues remain modest, this is expected.  
Table 3 reports  individual  villagers‟  assessment  of  pradhans‟  perceived  leadership  quality,  and  their 
effectiveness in providing key types of public goods, separately for males and females. Two conclusions 
                                                 
11 Panel 2 excludes Kerala and Maharashtra where the pradhan is indirectly elected by a vote among elected the ward members.    12 
stand out. First, there are only very few instances where perceived leadership quality differs markedly 
between  „reserved‟  and  „unreserved‟  pradhans;  for  the  vast  majority  of  areas  such  as  technical 
qualifications, awareness of national problems, ability to effectively provide local public goods or solve 
local disputes, respondents do not perceive differences between the two groups. Exceptions are „honesty 
and fairness‟ where males and females rank pradhans benefiting from gender reservations slightly lower 
(marginally  significant  for  females)  and  -for  female  respondents  only-  the  ability  to  bring  village 
problems to the attention of higher levels of government and (marginally significant) the selection of 
beneficiaries for central schemes. Second, there is little basis to conclude that reservation reduced the 
quality  of  service  provision.  Using  the  classification  introduced  earlier,
12 „reserved‟  pradhans  are 
perceived  to  have  improved  quality  of  health  services  and  electrification  (for  male  and  female 
respondents), credit and input as well as government schemes (for males only and in the latter case 
marginally for women). Males rank them somewhat worse for drinking water and sanitation. There is thus 
no evidence to support strong conclusions either way.  
3.2 Political participation, accountability, and willingness to contribute to public goods  
To descriptively explore impacts of reservation on political participation, we use the number of village 
meetings (gram sabhas) convened, attendance in such meetings by individuals, their active participation, 
and adherence to procedure such as prior announcement of the agenda and preparation of minutes as 
proxies for the quality of local political processes. Results in the top panel of table 4 are consistent with 
the notion that having a female leader increases political participation (Beaman et al. 2009, Bhavnani 
2009) and the extent to which political processes adhere to norms. „Reserved‟ female pradhans convene 
more gram sabha meetings (7.2 vs. 6.6 and 6.2 vs. 5.7 for male or female respondents, respectively) that 
are better attended (4.4 vs. 3.5 by males and 4.6 vs. 3.3 by females), and that are characterized by higher 
quality of participation (voicing of concerns; marginally significant for females) and advance knowledge. 
Males, but not females, also perceive significant differences in terms of minutes being always prepared 
and accessible between reserved and unreserved panchayats.  
Questions regarding willingness to contribute to public goods at the margin, as reported in the second 
panel of table 4, support the notion that in reserved panchayats, individuals are more willing to contribute 
to public goods, with differences being more significant for males than females (though levels for health, 
sanitation, education, natural resource management, and government schemes are higher for females). In 
reserved panchayats, men and women are more likely to contribute to irrigation, education, health, natural 
                                                 
12 We distinguish social services (sanitation, drinking water, education, and health), productive infrastructure (roads, irrigation, and electricity), 
and club goods (credit and input subsidies, government schemes, street lighting, and ceremonies) where the scope for appropriation is high.    13 
resource management, government schemes, and social issues or ceremonies. Men also increase their 
hypothetical contribution to sanitation, credit and (marginally) roads in reserved panchayats but are less 
willing to contribute to drinking water and do not change attitudes to electrification and street lights.  
To assess how reservation affect local government accountability, we inquired about villagers‟ ability to 
hold officials to account, ensure that problems with local public goods are taken care of, and beneficiaries 
for centrally sponsored schemes -a key mechanisms to deliver public goods and social services in India- 
selected in a are selected in a transparent manner. Responses (with details on variables discussed earlier) 
in the bottom panel of table 4 suggest that, for males but not for females, reservation increases leader‟s 
accountability in all three respects, though in some cases with marginal significance only. 
4. Econometric results  
Regression results suggest that, although their impact on perceived quality of public service provision in 
the immediate reservation period is limited, reservations increase the level and quality of participation in 
political processes, the extent to which procedural details of local democracy are adhered to, and voting 
participation in the longer term. We also find evidence of reservations leading to improvements in self-
reported ability to hold local officials to account and individuals‟ willingness to contribute to different 
types of public goods that persist over time. For most of these, short-term effects on females are much 
smaller than longer-term ones, pointing towards the possibility of learning and suggesting analysis with a 
longer time horizon is indeed appropriate.  
4.1 Perceived quality of public good delivery  
While descriptive statistics are suggestive, econometric analysis is needed to control for respondent and 
location characteristics, explore potential heterogeneity of impacts, and assess the extent to which impacts 
persist beyond the immediate reservation period. Econometric results are consistently reported, in tables 
5-8, for three models. Model 1 only includes an indicator for current reservation (γ 1), model 2 where this 
variable is interacted with an indicator variable for female gender (φ1), and model 3 that also includes 
indicator variables for past reservation (γ 2) and its interaction with a female dummy (φ2). In addition to 
γ1and φ1, we report F-statistics for γ1+φ1=0 and γ2+φ2=0, to test whether females benefited from recurrent 
or past reservations.  
We first check whether quality of public good provision is lower for panchayats with reserved rather than 
unreserved seats.
13 Table 5 reports results from regressions where the dependent variable is a zero -one 
                                                 
13 Recall that in all regressions, state-level fixed effects, age, education, and dummies for caste, religion, landlessness, and marital status are 
included throughout. Also, clustering at the household level is adjusted for in all regressions.    14 
indicator of perceived improvements in the quality of public good provision compared to the previous 
panchayat using the categories of public goods introduced earlier. With the exception of individual or 
club goods, which are perceived to have been better allocated in reserved panchayats, model 1 does not 
allow us to reject the hypothesis of reservation having no effects. Model 2 implies that even in the case of 
club goods, it was only males who perceived improvements while females did not see any change with 
reservation.  A  similar  phenomenon  is  observed  for productive  public  goods where  distinguishing  by 
gender of respondent reveals a marginal improvement in perception by males. At the same time, model 
points to some positive effects of reservation on perceived quality of public goods in the longer term, with 
γ2>0 for productive and individual public goods (and at 10%) for social ones. At least for productive and 
club goods, this appears to be more than just a rebound after declines during reservation. In all cases, the 
hypothesis of current or past effect on females can be rejected at conventional levels of significance.  
Our failure to find consistent impacts of reservation on quality of service provision mirrors findings in the 
literature and can possibly be explained in a number of ways. Even if female leaders perform better than 
males, cultural bias against acknowledging such performance may imply that perceptions are filtered 
before being reported (Beaman et al. 2009). Also, if there are persistent effects it may be more difficult to 
identify these in an environment where each panchayat will have been reserved at least once (Beaman et 
al. 2010). Another possibility is that the (negative) effect of „reserved‟ pradhans‟ lower qualifications is 
cancelled out by villagers‟ greater willingness to contribute to public goods or that measurement error 
biases results towards zero. More detailed analysis, including that of intermediate variables, is needed to 
discriminate among these competing explanations.  
4.2 Political participation  
To assess the impact of reservations on participation in local political processes, table 6 reports results 
from regressions with the frequency and nature of participation in village meetings and the extent to 
which these adhere to common standards as dependent variables. Model one points to a significant rise in 
the number of meetings attended, estimated to increase by 1.3 compared to a mean of 3.7, advance 
knowledge of the agenda for such meetings and if minutes were kept (by 5 and 4 percentage points, 
respectively) but not on the probability of voicing concerns in such meetings. Disaggregating by gender in 
model 2 illustrates that the increase in gram sabha attendance is particularly pronounced for females 
whose participation increased much more than that by men. Gender disaggregation also reveals that the 
insignificant overall coefficient on voicing concerns can be attributed to a highly significant reduction for 
males  and  a  more  than  commensurate  increase  for  females  who  significantly  increased  their  active 
participation in gram sabhas. At least part of the rise in women‟s voicing concerns in panchayats with   15 
reserved leadership does thus appear to come at the cost of men. Highly significant contemporaneous 
impacts on knowledge of procedures are estimated to be largely confined to men.  
Adding a lagged effect of reservation in model 3 provides more insights. First, while participation rises in 
the reserved period, it declines significantly thereafter having, something that may be due to a reduction 
in the number of meetings convened, a variable that is at the discretion of the pradhan. Increases in the 
voicing of concerns, the knowledge of the agenda and of minutes, on the other hand, are estimated to be 
persistent over time. In other words, after a panchayat had been reserved for a woman, higher shares of 
male as well as female respondents knew the agenda of gram sabha meetings. The significant lagged 
effect on agenda on females for this variable may suggest that, possibly because of learning, the impact of 
female reservation may affect women with some lag.  
4.3 Ability to hold local officials to account and willingness to contribute to public goods  
Although the fact that information on individuals‟ perceived ability to hold officials to account could not 
be obtained retrospectively may reduce the precision of coefficient estimates, responses to this question 
can provide insights regarding the extent to which concurrent or past reservation improved accountability 
of leaders and officials at the local level. Table 7 reports results from estimating (1) with the dependent 
variable an indicator of whether respondents find it easy or very easy to hold local officials to account 
with regard to provision of local public goods, general administrative functions, and beneficiary selection 
points towards significant impacts of reservations on local accountability.
14 Model 1 suggests that in 
reserved panchayats, (male) respondents find it significantly easier to hold officials accountable  for local 
public good provision, but not general administrative functions or transparent selection of beneficiaries of 
central schemes. In none of the cases can we reject the hypothesis of reservation not affecting females‟ 
ability to ensure accountability (model 2).  
Introducing a lagged indicator for female reservation changes the picture dramatically; regressions now 
suggest that concurrent reservation has a positive and significant effect throughout. In many cases, this 
effect is even bigger for panchayats that had been reserved on the past where we find strong evidence that 
reservation-induced effects persist. Also, in contrast to effects that are not or only marginally significant, 
females‟ ability to hold local officials to account is estimated to increase significantly over time for two 
out of the three types of goods considered (local public goods and general administrative functions). From 
a substantive point of view, this is consistent with the notion that time is needed for females to overcome 
                                                 
14 We also tried the regressions where the dependent variable equals one if the answer code 4 or 5 was chosen. The results are highly consistent 
with those based on code 1 or 2 as the signs are exactly the opposite.    16 
a legacy of discrimination and familiarize themselves with the mechanics of political decision-making or 
effective ways to access information. From a methodological perspective, the significance and magnitude 
of the coefficients on past reservation implies that a focus on contemporaneous effects of reservations 
only may provide less than the full picture and significantly underestimate the impact of this policy. 
While greater accountability by local officials is one way in which reservations can change the political 
equilibrium, having greater voice may also induce them to contribute more actively to political processes 
and the provision of specific services. Table 8 tests this hypothesis for the three types of public good 
described earlier, conditional on such contributions triggering larger support by government. The top 
panel suggests that suggests that reservations indeed lead to an increase in individuals‟ willingness to 
contribute to public goods; having a female leader increases this willingness by 1.7, 1.2, and 1 percentage 
points (the last only marginally significant), respectively. Model 2 implies that, with the exception of 
social goods, these effects are limited to males.  
Results from model 3 suggest that effects of reservation are not only very persistent but also gender-
differentiated.
 15 If an indicator for lagged reservation is introduced, regressions suggest a strong and 
significant current impact of reservation on social, productive, and club goods that extends to females in 
the first case. The effect persists for productive and individual goods in the case of males and social and 
individual goods in the case of females. With estimated increases of between 2 and 4 percentage points, 
the estimated increase in voluntary contributions amounts to some 10 percent of overall contributions and 
is thus not insignificant. This suggests that -contrary to political participation where longer-term impacts 
will be conditional on actions by the new panchayat president- female reservations lead to sustained 
increases in individuals‟ willingness to support public goods.  
5. Conclusion and policy implications  
Our analysis contributes to the debate on the extent to which reserving political positions for females can 
improve political outcomes. The fact that India has adopted far-reaching policies -allocated randomly 
across villages- to overcome the country‟s high level of gender bias and social stratification a long time 
ago makes this particularly suitable for our analysis. A nation-wide sample with a rich set of information 
for  the  period  under  concern  allows  us  to  contribute  to  the  literature  from  a  methodological  and  a 
substantive perspective.  
Methodologically, we note that exploring effects of having had reservations in the past and differentiating 
between male and female respondents can provide new insights. For example, to the case of whether or 
                                                 
15 As our survey collected data only for the current period, it is impossible to make inferences on longer-term effects beyond one period.    17 
not concerns were voiced in village assemblies, a positive reservation-effect on females and a negative 
one on males -which is plausible if the length of meetings did not change- would not be detected if only 
household-level data were used. Use of a longer horizon also allows us to provide, to our knowledge for 
the first time, an econometric estimate of whether reservation-induced effects persist, i.e. whether having 
had leadership positions reserved for females in the past will have an impact on current outcomes. If 
reservation-induced effects persistent, failure to allow for this may lead to biased coefficients. Our results 
suggest that this may indeed be of relevance in a number of cases.  
Substantively,  complementing  reduced  form  equations  of  reservation  on  public  good  provision  with 
variables that allow inferences regarding underlying mechanisms turns out to be informative. Variables 
such as political participation, access to information, willingness to contribute to public goods, and the 
ability to hold local leaders to account, all appear to be affected by reservation, though in the short term 
impacts may be more pronounced for males than for females. Greater and more effective participation in 
political processes could thus be a key channel for reservations to affect outcomes. The importance of 
learning which emerges from our results is consistent with the notion that those who had been excluded 
from political processes need time to familiarize themselves with the nature of political interaction and 
the most effective ways to make their voice heard locally.  
If greater political participation is an important channel for reservation-induced effects to materialize, 
research to explore how reservations can complement other measures to enhance such participation or its 
effectiveness will be of great interest. This could be combined with use of direct information on outcomes 
that are likely to be affected by reservations -and which may range from breastfeeding and child health to 
intra-household bargaining or running for elected office by females- rather than perceptions about public 
good quality. Advantages of doing so would include the ability to explore how impacts of reservation 
might vary across for groups in the population and to assess whether measurement error associated with 
perception-based data underlies the largely ambiguous findings regarding quality of service delivery. If a 
major effect of reservations is from improving individuals‟ ability to participate in political processes and 
hold leaders to account, they are likely to interact with other interventions aiming to inform villagers on 
ways to access information, make their voice heard, ensure adherence to the rules, and seek to redress 
misbehavior. Exploring these interactions opens up not only a promising research agenda but is also of 
great policy relevance to help reservations accomplish their original goal of empowering those who had 
traditionally been excluded to effectively overcome biases that might arise from such exclusion or under-
representation.    18 
Table 1: Initial village and household characteristics by reservation status of the village 
Variables   Total  Village reserved?  Test for equality  
  Mean  Yes  No   
         
Initial Village Characteristics         
Population in 1999  3870  3381  4088  0.81 
Share of population Hindu (%)  86.60  84.49  87.53  0.87 
Share of population Muslin (%)  6.62  6.92  6.48  0.19 
Net area sown (acres)   1190  1181  1193  0.06 
Net Area irrigated under Canal/Stream (acres)  323  221  370  1.24 
Access to Bank  0.71  0.72  0.71  0.13 
Distance to Mandi(km)  12.69  12.52  12.76  0.12 
Distance to retail market (km)  8.67  8.87  8.57  0.22 
Distance to nearest Town (km)  14.38  14.64  14.27  0.23 
Distance to nearest Pucca Road (km)  2.45  2.22  2.56  0.45 
Share of village with st. lights  0.49  0.42  0.53  1.43 
Share of villages with PCO  0.33  0.28  0.35  1.04 
Share of villages with trained dai  0.56  0.55  0.57  0.26 
Share of villages with male health worker  0.47  0.35  0.52  2.31** 
Share of villages with female health workers  0.61  0.52  0.65  1.81* 
Share of villages with Anganwadi  0.82  0.80  0.83  0.32 
Share of scheme building drinking water   0.24  0.23  0.25  0.35 
Share of scheme building road  0.18  0.21  0.17  0.81 
Share of villages with food for work programs  0.48  0.52  0.46  0.90 
Daily male agricultural casual wage (Rs./day)  49.86  49.85  49.87  0.01 
Daily female agricultural casual wage (Rs./day)  31.59  32.58  31.35  0.76 
No. of observations  233  71  162   
         
Initial Household Characteristics         
Members < 14  1.93  1.92  1.93  0.24 
members 14-60  3.97  4.04  3.95  1.15 
Members > 60  0.42  0.40  0.43  1.35 
Head's years of education  4.92  5.00  4.89  0.65 
Head completed primary   0.51  0.51  0.51  0.17 
Head completed middle school  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.16 
Head's age  49.50  48.97  49.70  1.53 
Female head  0.05  0.06  0.05  1.3 
Area of cropland(acres)  2.75  2.78  2.74  0.21 
Value of physical assets (Rs.)  43127  41358  43810  0.9 
Value of total assets (Rs.)  52564  51829  52848  0.34 
Household total income (Rs.)  15549  15380  15615  0.21 
Share of crop income   0.52  0.53  0.52  0.44 
Share of agriculture  0.67  0.68  0.66  1.22 
Share of off-farm income (Rs.)  0.32  0.31  0.33  1.18 
Household total expenditure (Rs.)  37769  37807  37755  0.04 
Household consumption (Rs.)  9274  9367  9239  0.45 
No. of observations  4,275  1,191  3,084   
Note: Distance to railway station, bus stand, post office, telephone office, weekly market, and all the other schemes between the reserved and 
unreserved groups are not statistically significant. The column „test for equality‟ reports the |t|-statistic for the test of equality of means. 
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Table 2:Pradhan, election characteristics, and public spending for reserved and non-reserved villages 
  Reserved  Test for equality  
  Yes  No   
       
Pradhan characteristics       
Illiterate   24.72  5.74  *** 
At least primary education  75.28  94.26  *** 
At least secondary education  28.65  62.69  *** 
At least high school education   6.18  22.08  *** 
SC/ST  30.02  27.51   
Muslim  0.044  0.050   
Female  98.36  6.65  *** 
Held political office before  11.67  24.24  *** 
Was candidate before  6.67  20.92  *** 
       
Characteristics of the election        
Number of candidates contested  3.51  3.38   
Share of population voted  76.2  72.1  *** 
Share of votes received  47.35  49.01   
       
Revenue & expenditure (Rs. per capita/year)       
Local revenue per capita  174.42  169.07   
  of which from govt. sources  156.58  151.79   
  of which from own sources  17.84  17.47   
Centrally sponsored schemes  268.73  201.67   
No. of observation  180  459   
Source: Own calculation based on REDS/NCAER 2007 Survey. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: Number of candidates contested is only for the 15 states where the pradhan is directly elected by popular vote i.e., Kerala 
and Maharashtra are excluded. 
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Table 3:Perceived Pradhan attributes and quality of public good provision by gender and reservation status 
  Male respondents  Female respondents 
  Reserved    Reserved   
  Yes  No  Test   Yes  No  Test 
             
Leadership qualities             
Honesty & fairness  0.533  0.543  ***  0.508  0.513  * 
Technical qualification  0.461  0.466    0.437  0.436   
National knowledge  0.477  0.483    0.462  0.459   
Provide local public good  0.582  0.579    0.561  0.557   
Solve local disputes  0.449  0.452    0.426  0.43   
Beneficiary selection  0.244  0.248    0.229  0.235  * 
Represent village upwards  0.499  0.499    0.463  0.475  *** 
No of observations  30,708  72,254    28,418  67,874   
         
Effectiveness in providing …         
Sanitation & sewage  0.643  0.654  *  0.633  0.639   
Roads & transport  0.659  0.651    0.669  0.668   
Irrigation  0.198  0.199    0.217  0.221   
Drinking water  0.538  0.552  **  0.494  0.498   
Electrification  0.523  0.503  ***  0.486  0.468  *** 
Street lights  0.516  0.511    0.495  0.501   
Credit  0.342  0.329  ***  0.302  0.295   
Education  0.717  0.71    0.637  0.642   
Health  0.443  0.427  ***  0.489  0.477  *** 
NR management  0.327  0.326    0.295  0.302   
Government schemes  0.472  0.314  ***  0.292  0.282  * 
Social issues & ceremonies  0.516  0.509    0.469  0.475   
No. of observations  9,826  23,568     9,204  22,394   
Note: Numbers in the top panel refer to the share of respondents who ranked the Pradhan „high‟ or „medium‟ for each category. 
In the bottom panel, numbers refer to the share of respondents indicating that their household‟s situation regarding a specific 
public good is „somewhat‟ or „much‟ better under the current than under the previous panchayat. In both cases, results are 
obtained from a regression including state dummies.  
Test 1 and 2 in the rightmost columns are for male vs. female respondents in reserved vs. unreserved panchayats.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Participation in meetings and willingness to contribute to public goods by gender and reservation status 
  Male respondents  Female respondents 
  Reserved    Reserved   
  Yes  No  Test   Yes  No  Test  
             
Gram Sabha meetings             
No. of meetings held  7.247  6.59  ***  6.188  5.734  *** 
No. attended  4.381  3.54  ***  4.616  3.266  *** 
Active participation  0.651  0.674  **  0.377  0.339  * 
Advance knowledge   0.285  0.384  ***  0.413  0.446  * 
Minutes always prepared  0.587  0.554  ***  0.819  0.806   
Minutes always accessible  0.599  0.572  ***  0.425  0.433   
No. of observations  2,833  9,766    1,514  5,035   
             
Willingness to contribute             
Sanitation & sewage  0.416  0.392  **  0.510  0.510   
Roads & transport  0.540  0.519  *  0.465  0.447   
Irrigation  0.174  0.099  ***  0.144  0.109  *** 
Drinking water  0.674  0.726  ***  0.575  0.585   
Electrification  0.141  0.148    0.147  0.137   
Street lights  0.601  0.609    0.523  0.538   
Credit  0.125  0.061  ***  0.104  0.088  * 
Education  0.364  0.335  **  0.408  0.370  *** 
Health  0.479  0.455  **  0.515  0.480  *** 
NR management  0.129  0.068  ***  0.175  0.105  *** 
Government schemes  0.200  0.147  ***  0.224  0.191  *** 
Social issues & ceremonies  0.192  0.135  ***  0.152  0.127  ** 
No. of observations  2,586  5,657    2,538  5,580   
             
Leadership accountability
1              
Getting public goods fixed   0.493  0.470  **  0.271  0.266   
Perform admin. functions  0.499  0.483  *  0.265  0.268   
Transp. beneficiary selection  0.491  0.478  *  0.261  0.265   
No. of observations  3,891  8,595    3,593  8,130   
Note: Test 1 and 2 in the rightmost columns are for male vs. female respondents in reserved vs. unreserved panchayats.  
*, **, and *** denotes significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
1In all cases, the figure given is the share of respondents who find it easy to ensure performance of the service.    22 
Table 5: Female reservation and perceived improvements in quality of public good provision 
  Social  Productive  Individual 
Model 1:       






No of obs.   260,172  125,103  194,321 
R
2  0.12  0.07  0.13 
Model 2:        












Test:        
   γ1 + φ1 = 0  0.04  0.15  0.11 
No of obs.   260,172  125,103  194,321 
R
2  0.12  0.07  0.13 
Model 3:        
























Tests:        
  γ1 + φ1 = 0  0.02  0.28  0.05 
  γ 2 + φ2 = 0  0.06  0.00  0.00 
No of individuals   181,567  81,446  126,877 
R
2  0.11  0.07  0.13 
Note: The dependent variable is 1 if quality of public service provision is „much‟ or „somewhat‟ better than in the previous panchayat period. 
Categories are defined as follows: Social includes sanitation and sewage, drinking water, education,  and health; productive includes roads, 
irrigation and electricity; individual includes credit, government schemes, street lights, and ceremonies.  As we stack observations for the 
different types of services, we have 5, 3, and 4 observations per individual for the different types.  
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Table 6: Female reservation and characteristics of village meetings  
  No. of meetings 
attended 
Voiced concerns  Knew agenda   Knew minutes 
kept 
Model 1:          








No of individuals  12,911   13,065   13,103   12,973  
R
2  0.53  0.41  0.30  0.39 
Model 2:          
















Test:         
  γ1 + φ1 = 0  65.47***  4.85**  0.41  0.17 
No of individuals  12,911   13,065   13,103   12,973  
R
2  0.53  0.42  0.30  0.39 
Model 3          
































Tests:         
  γ1 + φ1 = 0  2.84*  3.00*  1.45  4.08** 
   γ 2 + φ2 = 0  0.16  0.84  3.79**  2.29 
No of individuals  9,325  9,414  9,465  9,391 
R
2  0.55  0.41  0.32  0.39 
Note: Village-level fixed effects, household and individual characteristics (age, education, marital status, sex, caste, and landlessness) and 
dummies for different Panchayat periods are included in all regressions. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at household level. Robust t-
statistics are given in parentheses. We have three observations per individual, corresponding to the three panchayat periods, in models 1 and 2 
and two observations in model 3 due to the inclusion of a lagged effect.   
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 Table 7: Female reservations and individuals’ perceive ability to hold local officials to account  
  Local public goods   General admin. 
functions 
Beneficiary selection 
Model 1:       






Observations  24,163  24,170  24,167 
R
2  0.10  0.11  0.11 
Model 2:       












Test:       
   γ+φ=0  (1.78)  (0.07)  (0.11) 
Observations  24,163  24,170  24,167 
R
2  0.10  0.11  0.11 
Model 3:        
























Tests:       
  γ1 + φ1 = 0  5.44*  0.47  0.55 
  γ 2 + φ2 = 0  39.52***  34.28***  39.18 
Observations  16,107  16,112  16,110 
R
2  0.11  0.11  0.11 
Note: State fixed effects as well as dummies for caste, religion, landlessness and marital status as well as continuous variables for age and 
education included throughout but not reported. No time effects are included as data are available only for the current panchayat period 
Standard errors are adjusted for household level clustering effect.  Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.  
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Table 8: Female reservation and willingness to contribute to different types of public goods  
  Social  Productive  Individual 
Model 1:       






No of observations  56,737  40,781  61,808 
R
2  0.20  0.17  0.19 
Model 2:        












Test:       
  γ1 + φ1 = 0   (3.55)*  (2.40)  (0.06) 
No of observations  56,737  40,781  61,808 
R
2  0.20  0.17  0.19 
Model 3:       
























Tests:       
  γ1 + φ1 = 0  5.90**  2.60  0.93 
   γ 2 + φ2 = 0  8.13***  0.02  17.24*** 
No of observations  37,821  27,185  41,201 
R
2  0.20  0.17  0.19 
Note: State-level fixed effects, household and individual characteristics (age, education, marital status, sex, caste, and landlessness) and dummies 
for different Panchayat periods are included in all regressions. Standard errors are adjusted for household clustering effect.  Robust t statistics in 
parentheses.   
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